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ABSTRACT: This article presents evidence of the governance challenges faced by Australian not-
for-profit (NFP) organisations. We find a key challenge for NFPs is recruiting individuals with 
appropriate skills, as directors are volunteers often elected by the membership and frequently lack 
relevant experience. Another issue is balancing the needs of a diverse constituency with competing 
demands. We find that the often proposed solution to this challenge – stakeholder representation on 
boards – can further hinder the recruitment of suitable directors and create tensions detrimental to 
board effectiveness. We argue to shift focus away from normative governance models towards a 
contingency approach and posit a role for a national NFP sector regulator in assisting to develop 
appropriate governance systems according to contextual factors.   
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PAPER TEXT 
Multiple definitions of not-for-profit (NFP) organisations and the NFP sector can be found. In this 
article we follow Hansmann, who describes an NFP organisation as "[…] an organization that is 
barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as 
members, officers, directors, or trustees" (Hansmann 1980) (p. 838). The Australian NFP sector 
comprises more than 600,000 non-commercial and non-governmental organisations with a wide range 
of purposes that range from hospitals to community services, universities, sports clubs, aged care 
facilities and environmental groups.  
The Australian regulatory environment in which NFPs operate has long been recognised as being 
overly complex (Australian Productivity Commission 2010). Established in December 2012, the 
Australian Charities and Not-for-Profit Commission (ACNC) is the first national independent 
regulator of charities in Australia and the latest initiative focusing on NFP governance and reform. Its 
objective is to deliver smarter and more effective regulation of the sector. The advantage of the ACNC 
as a single national regulator is that once registered, organisations will be freed from supervision by 
other Commonwealth and state agencies. An entity can only be registered, and continue to be 
registered, once it meets a number of governance standards: basic requirements that cover the 
fundamentals of governance, while encouraging governance beyond these minimal standards. 
                                                 NOT FOR PROFIT GOVERNANCE 
Ostrower and Stone (2006) observed that governance is rarely unambiguously defined in literature 
concerning NFP organisations and that research has mainly focused on boards of directors. Indeed, 
there are many studies concerning NFP governance that have concentrated on boards and their 
composition, the roles and responsibilities of their members and the relation between board 
effectiveness and organisational effectiveness (for example: Herman and Renz 2000; Callen et al. 
2003). BoardSource describes the roles of NFP boards as follows: (1) setting organisational direction 
and strategy, (2) monitoring or providing oversight of the CEO, assets and programs of the 
organisation and (3) ensuring necessary human and financial resources (BoardSource 2010). 
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Accompanying these specific roles are a number of theoretical perspectives. For example, in relation 
to the first mentioned role, a stewardship theory perspective would be most relevant as “[…] 
stewardship theory emphasises the role of the board in driving forward organisational performance 
through adding value to the organisation’s strategy and top decisions” (Cornforth 2001) (p. 7). The 
second role, which states that it is the board’s role to monitor management, is closely aligned with 
agency theory. This theory sees the board as the instrument to ensure that management acts in the best 
interests of shareholders or members, as it assumes that management is likely to act in their own 
interests rather than to the benefit of investors or beneficiaries (Miller 2002). Thirdly, the board’s role 
to provide resources aligns with resource-dependency theory, which argues that organisations depend 
on other organisations and actors for survival (Cornforth 2001, citing Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). 
Resource-dependency theory sees the board as a means of finding or providing these resources 
Cornforth and Brown (2013) recognise the board of directors as the body with the main responsibility 
for governance, but emphasise that other stakeholders also play an important role. For Cornforth, key 
actors such as managers, members and advisory groups also contribute to the governance of a NFP 
organisation. The need to involve the stakeholders of NFP organisations in governance processes is 
increasingly recognised (Freiwirth 2013). As the purpose of NFPs is to advance its mission and fulfil 
the needs of its constituency, the exclusion of stakeholders from governance and decision-making 
processes can compromise service delivery (Freiwirth 2007). In these cases a stakeholder theory 
approach to governance is most relevant, as it states that the board’s role is to mediate between 
stakeholders and balance their interests (Edward Freeman and Evan 1991). However, the extent of 
stakeholder involvement will vary: some organisations will engage with stakeholders where others 
will have stakeholder representatives as board members.  
Board Composition and Stakeholder Representation 
Stakeholder theory posits that by including diverse stakeholders on boards, organisations are more 
likely to address broad societal interests rather than the interests of a single group (Hung 1998). 
(Young 2011) suggests that NFP boards should have representatives from each funding source in 
proportion to contribution, as donor representation has been shown to improve organisational 
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performance. This suggestion is opposite to recommendations for commercial boards which 
emphasise director independence from investor groups. It acknowledges that links to resources are 
more important to NFPs than independent monitoring. Young further argues that there is natural 
independence on the part of NFP directors due to their volunteer status, while recognising that this 
status provides little financial incentive to exert effort (Young 2011). Indeed, because of this volunteer 
status, the process of recruiting new directors is completely different in a NFP compared to a 
commercial organisation (Hendricks and Wyngaard 2010). NFPs are often challenged when ensuring 
the board has the right skills to fulfil its responsibilities (Spear et al. 2009). These differences mean 
that governance designed for commercial entities cannot simply be imported into the NFP sector.  
Perhaps the most common NFP governance challenge identified in the literature is the need to balance 
different stakeholders’ interests. Unlike a commercial entity where the aim is to create profits for 
shareholders (arguably whilst also taking other stakeholder interests into account in order to ensure 
long-term sustainability) a NFP board will have to choose between the needs and desires of different 
groups. For example, donors to charities can impose limitations on ways in which money can be spent 
by designating specific themes, which may not be in the interests of all beneficiaries. This forces NFP 
organisations to ‘go where the money is’, thereby creating a situation where donor dependency can 
undermine the organisation’s mission (Alymkulova and Seipulnik 2005). This can result in 
‘asymmetric accountability’ (Jordan and Van Tuijl 2000; Schepers 2006). In cases where goals of 
funders are not identical to those of the organisation receiving funding, upward accountability towards 
donors can become misaligned with downward accountability towards beneficiaries. Speckbacher 
concludes that one of the most important factors in the success of NFPs is having a common 
understanding of the organisation’s mission such that all stakeholders can cooperate (2008). 
Contingency Approach 
It is increasingly suggested that the use of a single theory describing NFP governance might be 
inadequate, as it is an “[…] increasingly untenable view that best practices exist for a wide range of 
non-profit governance situations” (Salipante 2013) (p.283). The intricacy of the sector and the distinct 
governance challenges that NFP organisations can encounter also explain why corporate governance 
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codes can be inappropriate for NFP governance (Spear et al. 2009) and why there is no agreement on 
an ideal NFP governance model (Miller-Millesen 2003; Ostrower and Stone 2006).  
The usefulness of a contingency approach in relation to governance is the acknowledgement that 
governance processes are likely to work differently according to changes in the nature of an 
organisation and its circumstances, and consequently effectiveness is connected to the ongoing 
refinement of governance systems in line with these contingencies (Bradshaw 2009), although 
Bradshaw cautions that a move away from “one best way” or normative approach to NFP governance 
can turn into “anything goes” (p. 61). Bradshaw finds that “[…] the boards engaged in debate and 
exercised strategic choice in selecting the best governance configuration according to their perceptions 
and values […]” (p. 77), which suggests that in practice NFP boards operate in ways a contingency 
approach predicts. Bradshaw suggests that more empirical research on contingencies in the NFP sector 
is needed to help organisations adapt governance systems (2009).  
A number of academics have taken a contingency approach in NFP governance research. They take 
into account the contextual factors that shape NFP board characteristics and influence the ways in 
which they operate (Cornforth 2003; Brown and Guo 2010; Iecovich 2005). Ostrower and Stone 
(2001) created a framework modelling the internal and external contingencies that influence board 
characteristics. They include external contingencies such as power in society, turbulence and the legal 
and institutional environment – labelled as ‘broad’ dimensions because they are the same for all NFPs.  
External contingencies such as stakeholders, industry and funding sources are labelled as ‘specific’ 
dimensions because they are unique to each NFP. Internal contingencies include age, size, phase of 
development, and complexity of the organisation. This model has been adapted by Cornforth to map 
contextual influences on boards found in other studies. It features social pressures, government 
legislation and policy, regulation, and the sector of the NFP as broad external contingencies, while the 
field of activity of the NFP is labelled as a specific external contingency. Cornforth identifies the size 
of the organisation and relationships with management as internal contingencies. It is argued that all 
contingencies influence the characteristics of the board, specifically the composition, relationships, 
and processes, which consequently affect board roles and effectiveness (Cornforth 2003).  
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                      RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
We have explored what NFP leaders believe are the key governance challenges they face, how these 
might be ameliorated and how they visualise the role of the ACNC. Based on survey and interview 
data, our research will demonstrate that NFP organisations are influenced by a number of internal and 
external contingencies that affect governance systems and processes. Data gathering consisted of two 
parts, namely an online survey. The survey link was circulated through networks of NFP professionals 
using LinkedIn and email marketing. Representatives of 53 NFP organisations completed the survey. 
Using survey data is a proven method to perform research into NFP sector governance (O’Regan and 
Oster 2005). There is also a growing tendency to use case studies and in-depth methods to research 
non-profits and their boards (Bradshaw et al. 1998). Therefore, survey data was complemented with 
twelve interviews, which were recorded, transcribed and coded in NVivo. 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Board roles 
Both the interview and survey data confirmed the well-known role of all boards in setting strategy, 
also revealing that some boards struggle with this role. Other board responsibilities that were 
mentioned were monitoring, as well as attracting resources:  
“Really their main job is a combination of thinking strategically on behalf of the organisation and 
monitoring performance […]” [INT1] 
“It is monitoring decision making. I would like to be more strategic […]” [INT5] 
“Strategy and attracting sponsors.” [INT6] 
“It’s monitoring and advice, not strategic.” [INT11] 
The online survey confirmed the multi-faceted role of the board, with no single role standing out as 
being more important in comparison to others (Figure 1). On a scale of 1 (not important) to 7 (very 
important), all board roles averaged a score between 3.8 and 4.2. The standard deviation for the 
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importance of board roles lies between 1.6 and 2.7, indicating that there is considerable variation in 
the importance of particular roles for individual boards. 
Insert Figure 1 
The differing importance of particular board roles for each NFP shows why a contingency approach to 
governance is desirable. For example, the following interview quote demonstrates that board members 
can have little experience in organisational planning or strategy while the fulfilment of this task is 
deemed to be important. To remediate this situation, board members with appropriate skills will either 
need to be recruited or existing directors upskilled through training.  
“What I find is, as a board member […] I have to end up doing a lot of stuff, so I write the asset 
management plan and I have also written the strategic plan, because the CEO could do it, but we are 
not able to kind of pay the big bucks for a high powered CEO so I could probably do it better, and 
there is just not a lot of time when you only have three staff and you have tenancies happening all over 
the place. Whereas say if I was on the board of [a large NFP], you wouldn’t do any of that, you would 
purely be focused on governance in the sense of reviewing the work that your staff has done and 
giving that direction, and that is a whole different ball game.” [INT2]  
Board composition, recruitment and skill sets 
Our research provides evidence that recruitment of suitable directors is a significant challenge for NFP 
organisations, particularly those with membership-based governance models. The interview questions 
“how do you recruit board members” and “who qualifies for board membership” proved to be closely 
related because the constitution of NFP organisations often prescribes a specific pool of individuals 
from which board members must be sourced.  
“[Our governance arrangements] are very inflexible, the constitution and the incorporation 
requirements are really premised on you being a community based organisation that is run by 
members, where there will be a vibrant contest for positions that govern the organisation, and it 
doesn’t really work for the sort of work we do. We need people with skills and particular expertise, it 
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is quite hard to do that. We have been very fortunate that we have good people that have great 
expertise, but that is in spite of the governance, not because of it.” [INT11]  
“There is a set of criteria in the constitution which talks about the skills they should have. So the 
constitution sets it up as a skills based board […] In actual practice, because we are only a small 
organisation, with a lot of them it is like “who will join”, and they are elected by the members who 
are mostly tenants. If you look at the skills list and you look who is actually on the board, a lot of the 
skills are missing and quite a lot of the board members probably don’t have any of those skills to any 
great degree.” [INT2] 
Ironically, there is evidence that existing governance arrangements in NFP organisations can impose 
constraints on the recruitment of suitable directors to enforce governance. This results in a situation 
where governance systems can have perverse and undermining effects. The incapacity of a number of 
NFP organisations to recruit directors based on skills, as well as the absence of financial incentives to 
join NFP boards, clearly sets NFP boards apart from commercial counterparts. As a result, training 
and development of existing board members is of vital importance to NFP organisations. 
Development and Training 
Seventy-two percent of our survey respondents responded affirmatively to the question “Does your 
organisation provide continuing professional training for its non-executive board members?” The 
interview respondents were also asked about initiatives that enable director skill development. They 
expressed more ambivalence and mentioned that although they were open to skills development of 
their directors, practicalities such as time, money and lack of interest on the part of board members 
had prevented any structured approach to skills development: 
“[…] we tried a couple of times to get people trained up, so at least everyone feels confident and 
they’re all on the same level. But we never actually managed to make it happen. And people are like 
‘ah, I don’t really feel like I need it personally.” [INT5] 
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 “I think they do the best that they can […] but we’re running on no money, the board all have full 
time jobs as well have given their time, some of them, for many years. So to the best of their ability, I 
don’t think we are going to take days out to develop, or pay for, board members to go to courses.” 
[INT12] 
As can be seen, variance in available resources for development can potentially affect the functioning 
of the board and represents a contingency that can influence each NFP organisation differently.  
Accountability and Stakeholder Interests 
The table below illustrates dependence on government funds by organisations in our survey sample. 
We argue that funding sources represent contingencies that, for reasons of accountability, need to be 
considered in any governance model.  
Insert Figure 2 
The importance of service delivery in the decision to financially support a NFP organisation was 
evident in the survey sample. When survey respondents were asked to rank the factors influencing 
donors to back the organisation in order of priority, the activities of the organisation were by far 
considered the most important. The importance of these activities in obtaining funding also became 
apparent from the interviews: 
 “But it’s our activities and our output that is what gets people to support us and want to stay engaged 
with us.” [INT2] 
 “So beyond our members we also have customers and clients of this organisation who buy our 
services or attend our training and those sorts of things. About a third of our funding comes from the 
NSW Government through the department of housing, so government is a major stakeholder for us 
[…]” [INT1] 
Considering that survey respondents defined the recipients of services, clients and/or beneficiaries as 
the most important stakeholders (figure 3), the fact that the majority of NFPs rely on government 
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funding creates a problematic dynamic. As governments are often the main funder, but are unlikely to 
be the direct recipients of services, donor dependency and asymmetric accountability form potential 
pitfalls. The interview quotes above reveal that these issues are likely to present a problem for all 
NFPs part of this research, albeit to different degrees depending on sources and quantity of funding. In 
reporting on activities and justifying spending, organisations are accountable to funders as well as to 
recipients of services, clients and/or beneficiaries. These groups will display varying degrees of 
overlap for each NFP organisation, which leads to different accountability mechanisms, suggesting 
that variations in funding circumstances represent contingencies that can affect governance models. 
Insert Figure 3 
The question of NFP accountability is closely related to the balancing of stakeholder interests. In the 
literature, balancing of stakeholder interests is identified as one of the key challenges for NFP boards 
(Young 2011; Dawson and Dunn 2006; Spear et al. 2009). Our interview findings confirm that NFP 
boards often have to balance the needs of multiple important stakeholders. The members and funders 
of the organisation are generally classified as being of the highest importance. 
“[…] two main ones are our core members and our government funding body here in NSW” [INT1] 
“[Tenants and] obviously the Department of Housing because they funded all the properties. They 
would probably be the two main ones.” [INT2] 
“So to me the two critical stakeholders are our funders and our members.” [INT7] 
The interviews indicate that the diversity of stakeholder groups and their differing expectations do 
indeed provide challenges for NFP organisations. When asked what the main challenges are that 
different stakeholder groups pose, interview participants responded: 
“Primarily the diversity of it. It is a constant challenge for this organisation to identify what business 
we are in and what our members and stakeholders expect of us, and how to respond to that […] Our 
job is to identify that our stakeholders are diverse in their expectations and can change almost on a 
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daily basis, but certainly on a weekly basis; to make prioritising decisions and strategic decisions 
about what we actually do and how we respond to our members and stakeholder’s expectations; what 
work we can do; and how much they have to pay for it.” [INT1] 
“Expectations, the balance between a national focus and a state focus, and the challenge of local 
priorities taking precedence over national initiatives.” [INT6] 
In order to balance stakeholder interests, (Young 2011) suggests to establish membership-based 
boards with equal stakeholder and donor representation, while Freiwirth argues in favour of 
Community-Engagement Governance™, in which responsibility for governance is shared across the 
organisation rather being placed entirely on the board (Freiwirth 2013). Our findings concerning board 
composition, recruitment, skill sets, and development demonstrate that membership-based boards and 
stakeholder-based boards, despite having the advantages advocated by Young and Freitwith, also have 
disadvantages, particularly in relation to the skill sets of board members, as recruitment processes and 
director development have shown to be problematic for NFP organisations 
Impact of ACNC Governance Standards 
The majority of online respondents considered the impact of the governance standards to be absent (30 
per cent) or minimal (38 per cent), while a smaller amount of respondents saw moderate (13 per cent) 
or large (4 per cent) impact, and yet others found it difficult to assess the effects of the ACNC and the 
governance standards (15 per cent). A majority of interview and survey respondents expressed 
confidence in their current governance arrangements and felt that the ACNC and its governance 
standards would not significantly impact their organisation. At the same time, interviewees 
commented that the ACNC could be helpful by being a body dedicated to the NFP sector:  
“I do think it’ll be better, because I think it is set up to give more support and guidance specifically for 
not-for-profits, as opposed to ASIC [Australian Securities and Investments Commission] that is so big 
that it couldn’t possibly spend all that much time writing guidelines […] if they could provide training 
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I suppose, tailored advice, that would be useful. Because there is obviously no point in doing the same 
thing as ASIC, but they give an impression of being a lot easier to deal with.” [INT5] 
Discussion of Findings 
It was found that no particular NFP board role stands out compared to others, rather the empirical data 
indicates that there is considerable variation in the importance of particular roles for individual boards, 
whether this concerns strategic direction, monitoring or obtaining funding. This has consequences for 
theoretical perspectives that are applied to NFP governance, as the usefulness of stewardship theory, 
agency theory, resource-dependence theory and stakeholder theory varies according to the different 
directives of NFP boards. This provides empirical evidence in favour of taking a contingency 
approach towards theories concerning NFP board roles (Figure 4). 
Our study provides evidence that recruitment of suitable directors is a significant challenge for NFP 
organisations, particularly concerning those NFPs with membership-based board models, as the 
constitution often determines the specific pool of individuals from which board members must be 
sourced. This can result in a situation where NFP organisations are unable to recruit directors based on 
skills and increases the importance of training and development of existing board members. While 
nearly three quarters of the survey respondents stated that the organisation facilitates professional 
training for directors, interview responses indicated that, in practice, lack of time and resources are 
obstacles for director development. Considering the importance of skills development on NFP boards 
due to recruitment complications, we contend that lack of resources for training and development of 
directors represents a contingency that can negatively impact the functioning of the board. 
Our findings furthermore indicate that funding circumstances represent contingencies that can impact 
the governance model of a NFP organisation. The data suggests that funding dynamics can negatively 
impact accountability and governance. Specifically the fact that the government is the largest donor of 
NFPs in the sample, while the recipients of services are classified as the most important stakeholders. 
The balancing of stakeholder interests is closely related to this finding. Some scholars argue for donor 
and stakeholder representation on NFP governance bodies (Freiwirth 2013; Young 2011), which may 
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help mitigate the negative elements associated with donor dependency and asymmetric accountability. 
However, we find that NFPs that have a membership-based board are often unable to recruit board 
members with appropriate skills, and that it can be challenging for NFPs to facilitate the development 
of the skills of their directors due to the lack of available resources, resulting in a conflicting dynamic 
between the demand for skills and stakeholder representation on governance bodies. 
The majority of our survey and interview respondents expressed confidence in their governance 
frameworks and stated that the ACNC governance standards were unlikely to have a significant 
impact. While the vast amount of respondents felt they did not need the ACNC or the governance 
standards, a number of interviewees stated that the ACNC and the governance standards could prove 
to be helpful for other NFP organisations. The ACNC was also described as a potential advisory and 
‘go-to’ body that can help establish basic regulation and increase public confidence in the sector.  
Insert Figure 4 
        CONCLUSIONS 
We argue that generic best practice governance standards for NFPs ought not to be further pursued. 
Instead the advancement of governance research will depend on working inductively from research 
findings towards theory and vice versa. Otherwise “[…] available theories may simply be too general 
and disconnected from the realities of boards” (Ostrower and Stone 2010) (p. 920). We argue in 
favour of a contextual approach that goes beyond the basics of governance. The inappropriateness of 
generic NFP governance standards does not mean there is no role for a body such as the ACNC in 
providing guidance on NFP governance – quite the opposite. The inability to impose a universal 
governance model on the diverse NFP sector means that outside bodies have an important role in 
guiding organisations in finding their own optimal governance structure. For example, the ACNC can 
remediate the conflicting dynamic between skillsets and stakeholder representation, by providing 
guidance on how to conduct formal assessment of the role of the board, and through offering training 
to those without relevant experience, the ACNC would contribute to the legitimacy of the NFP sector 
and would translate the contingency approach to NFP governance into a useful practice.   
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Importance of the board in performing the following functions  
(1) not important to (7) very important. 
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Figure 3: Sources of majority of funding. 
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Figure 4: Stakeholder groups in order of importance  
(1) most important to (10) least important. 
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Figure 5: Contingency framework (empirical findings in italic). 
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